Interdependence as Vulnerability
By Kate Jones
Interdependence as Vulnerability: Europe depends on what it cannot build, and China depends on power it cannot sustain; the foundation of the global transition is not independence, but shared weakness.
Recently, in a call with President Trump, Xi Jinping declared that Taiwan’s “return” is central to the post-war order. That claim only matters if China can sustain the industrial and military power required to enforce it. And that power depends on an energy system already under strain.
If the energy base falters, the industrial base contracts. If the industrial base contracts, military capability erodes. The rhetoric is absolute. The capacity behind it is conditional.
Europe’s “green independence” relies on Chinese manufacturing capacity it does not control: polysilicon, wafers, solar glass, inverters, magnets, rare earth refining, batteries, production equipment. Without those, Europe cannot deploy solar, wind, storage, or modern grid infrastructure at scale.
Meanwhile, China’s energy system is hitting physical limits. It has built more renewable capacity than any country in history, but huge portions cannot be used. Fragmented grids can’t move power. Wind and solar are routinely curtailed. Capacity exists on paper, not in practice.
Coal remains the stabilizing backbone. As renewables increase, coal capacity increases with them—the only buffer against blackouts.
Water scarcity adds another hard limit. Coal, nuclear, hydro, and industrial production all require cooling water. Many inland regions don’t have enough. Factory shutdowns and emergency coal generation are already happening during drought. Even nuclear power relies on imported uranium and foreign fuel fabrication.
And domestic demand is surging: heavy industry, battery production, EVs, and rapidly expanding data centers are consuming enormous power.
Here’s the contradiction: The more renewable manufacturing capacity China builds, the more coal it must burn to power it. This isn’t ideological. It’s mechanical.
China can declare Taiwan’s “return,” but enforcing it requires the same industrial output Europe needs for its transition. That output is constrained by energy.
Europe cannot replace Chinese components quickly. China cannot indefinitely power both Europe’s transition and a sustained military campaign.
What is described as independence is actually a redistribution of dependency.
The global transition reduces emissions, but it does not create energy autonomy for any major actor. Power cannot exceed the systems that sustain it.
Great shifts in power rarely fail at ideals—they fail at infrastructure.
A state may will conquest, but it can only sustain it at the pace its power grid allows.
Europe’s transition and China’s ambition are chained to the same turbines and the same coal seams. The contest is not just over territory or ideology, but over electricity, water, fuel, and the ability to move electrons without interruption.
Strategy is written in intentions. History is written in kilowatt-hours. China can claim Taiwan in words, but only energy can make it real.
Yet energy is far from the only limiter on China’s ambitions. Beyond these vulnerabilities, a potential invasion of Taiwan would face staggering military and operational challenges. The operation would be unprecedented, requiring coordination of missiles, airpower, naval forces, and logistics across the 80-100 mile Taiwan Strait—far more complex than historical amphibious assaults. China’s military lacks enough specialized amphibious ships, often relying on vulnerable civilian vessels like ferries, which could be targeted by Taiwan’s anti-ship missiles, mines, and drone swarms. Airborne insertions might deliver initial troops but at high risk from air defenses, including portable missiles and mobile systems, potentially leading to heavy casualties.
Geography compounds these issues. Taiwan’s eastern coast is rocky and impractical for landings, while the west features shallow waters that limit naval access and few deep-water ports for large-scale operations. The island’s central mountains, covering much of its terrain with peaks over 9,800 feet, would funnel any advance into narrow, ambush-prone plains, where flooding fields could immobilize armor. Climatically, the strait’s rough seas and monsoon seasons restrict viable windows for crossings, with fog, winds, and swells making most of the year unsuitable.
Economically, the stakes are catastrophic. Taiwan leads in semiconductor production, supplying a massive share of global chips, including much of China’s imports. An invasion or blockade could devastate foundries, triggering a worldwide economic downturn with trillions in losses and severe impacts on China’s trade-dependent economy, including disruptions to vital shipping lanes handling billions in annual trade. Even a blockade might shrink China’s GDP significantly, worsening domestic issues like real estate slumps and weak consumption.
Politically and domestically, the risks threaten regime stability. High casualties in a shrinking population could erode public support, particularly among youth more focused on economic woes than unification. A failed effort might undermine leadership and legitimacy, especially given Taiwan’s strong opposition to integration models and the challenge of governing a resistant population post-conflict.
Internationally, escalation looms large. U.S. commitments could draw in allies like Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, using submarines and missiles to sever supply lines. Nuclear risks, sanctions, and global backlash would isolate China, harming its image and potentially sparking broader conflict. These factors push Beijing toward subtler coercion rather than outright invasion, highlighting how interdependence turns ambition into vulnerability.